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ABSTRACT: 
Debates over the value and compatibility of different approaches to understanding and changing 
environmental-relevant actions proliferate across the social sciences. This article reviews and 
discusses some of the (socio-)psychological and sociological approaches in those debates. We will 
start by critically reviewing the (socio-)psychological perspectives, highlighting two main 
shortcomings. First, they are often partial in their focus – concentrating on the consumption side of 
climate relevant actions and, relatedly in changing these actions at the individual level. They tend to 
assume that individual change equates to social change and, with that, fail to contextualise ‘anti’-
environmental actions in current neo-liberal, capitalist societies. Second, they usually present the 
mainstream (socio-)psychological approaches, which are ontologically individualistic and cognitive, 
as the only existent ones, therefore neglecting other perspectives within Social Psychology which 
might actually be (more) compatible with sociological perspectives. We then suggest that Social 
Representations Theory (SRT), as an ontologically social-psychological approach and a theory of 
social change, might be reconciled with sociological approaches, such as Social Practices Theory 
(SPT), in contrast to the more individualistic (socio-)psychological perspectives. After reviewing the 
main tenets of SRT, its discrepancies and potential synergies with SPT, we discuss how the two can 
be articulated to understand different stages of the social change process towards more 
environmentally sustainable societies. While SPT might be more suitable to understand stability or 
how some actions become habitual, SRT might be better equipped to understand how those change, 
or how individuals and groups negotiate new actions with old ones. 
KEYWORDS: social representations theory; theories of practice; critical approach; pro-environmental 
actions 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“Today, there's no greater threat to our planet than climate change”1 
 
“And when we dream it, when we dream it, when we dream it 
Let's dream it, we'll dream it for free, free money”2 
 
After World War II, environmental social movements began to develop in the public sphere 
to demand the end of the exploitation of the Earth by and for human activity, as this was drastically 
changing and endangering it3. Still today, and as highlighted by the President of the USA, Barack 
Obama, in his weekly speech just before the Earth Day 2015, climate change is by many – even if not 
by all4,5 – seen as the biggest current threat to this planet. Within the social sciences this has led to 
research into how to understand and change people’s environmentally relevant actionsa being much 
shaped by the idea of the anthropocene, that is, that humans are the cause for the destruction of 
the Earth and its ecosystems (e.g.,6,7,8). This has led to much research on human behavior relevant to 
climate change, which can be organized into three main areas: adaptation to climate change (e.g., 
how do individuals and groups living in coastal areas adapt to increased flooding events?9), 
mitigation of climate change (e.g., how do individuals and groups react to large-scale wind farms 
being built in the place where they live?10), and communication on climate change (e.g., what is the 
impact that the media’s framing of climate change has on public beliefs about it?4). However, within 
all three areas, the anthropocene assumption is rarely discussed with a view to highlighting that it is 
not human activity per se that has a certain essence that will inevitably lead to humans to consider 
themselves superior to ecological systems and to exploit them necessarily for their own human 
needs and desires (see9,11). It therefore hides the fact that it is not humans in relationship with 
ecological systems that are problematic, but rather the socio-economic and political system11 
through which most of them, particularly in societies in the global north, have been organised over 
the last centuries. As Donna Haraway12 puts it, “the anthropos did not do this thing that threatens 
mass extinction [...] and if we were to use only one word for the processes we are talking about, it 
should be the capitalocene” (see also13). It is to this last aspect that the second quote above, from 
the lyrics of Patty Smith’s song, calls our attention. This quote tells us that we have been living for 
some time in a capitalist and neo-liberal system where free-market, capital and the individual are 
central. Consequently, there is a close relation between capitalism, neo-liberalism and 
environmental degradation (see14), even if this is not often acknowledged in much social science 
research, for example within social psychology.  
This paper will assume that close relation, through the review and critical discussion of the 
main (socio-)psychological and sociological approaches to understanding and changing 
environmentally relevant actions that have been proposed in recent decades. These approaches will 
be discussed with reference to their shortcomings, their ideological underpinnings and associated 
potential socio-ecological consequences, with the aim of proposing a new perspective for better 
understanding those actions, one that better highlights the relationship between socio-economic 
systems and climate change.  
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We will first discuss approaches that have been heatedly debated in recent years as being the 
‘best suited’ ones to understand people’s environmentally significant actions and to change them. 
Those approaches have been often presented as the (social) psychological (e.g.,15,16) and the social 
practices perspectives (e.g.,17,18,19), broadly speaking. We will then argue that within social 
psychology there are other perspectives, typically overlooked, that can contribute to a more 
nuanced understanding of climate-related actions. One such approach is the theory of social 
representations (SRT), which is ontologically a socio-psychological approach, contrary to the 
dominant individualistic and neo-liberal perspectives that are evident in some (social) psychology 
approaches (e.g.,15 ,20,21,22). Finally, we will discuss how SRT and social practice theories (SPT) can be 
combined to provide a better understanding of environmentally relevant actions.  
 
“PERSONAL CHANGE DOESN’T EQUAL SOCIAL CHANGEb”: A REVIEW OF THE MAIN 
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO CHANGING CLIMATE RELEVANT ACTIONS  
The ‘typology’ of ontological models of the individual that was put forward by Showm & 
Lorenzen20 in this journal is a good starting point to review the main (socio-)psychological and 
sociological approaches that have been used to understand environmental-relevant actions - even 
though it tends to adopt a soft version of the social and neglect paradigmatic incommensurability 
(see19,23), as further discussed below. To generalize a little, while the mainstream (socio-
)psychological approaches either conceive individuals/consumers as predictably irrational and/or 
Homo Economicus (e.g.,15,24), sociological approaches typically conceive the individual either as 
socially organized, through a social practice perspective (e.g.,25,26), or as locked-in to socio-technical 
systems, such as within multi-level perspectives of innovation (e.g.,27). We will now discuss what this 
means in more concrete terms.  
Predictably Irrational and Homo Economicus: The dominant (socio-)psychological approaches to 
environmental relevant actions and to change 
As Showm & Lorenzen18 propose and others illustrate15,16,21,22, social psychology has been 
mainly dominated so far by ontological perspectives that focus on the individual and tend to 
conceive her either as predictably irrational (or involved in habitual, automatic behaviours – e.g.,15), 
as Homo Economicus (as a rational decision-maker, involved in deliberative, mindful decisions  – 
see19,28 for a critique), or even both (see15 for a review; also24). Social psychology applied to the 
environmental field is no exception, even if it has mainly been the Homo Economicus perspective 
that has dominated the literature so far in this area, incorporated in attitude models such as the 
Theory of Reasoned Action and the Theory of Planned Behaviour (29; see also30,31 for derivative 
proposals, such as the Value-Belief-Norm theory; and19 for a critique). Nevertheless, some authors 
have more recently concentrated on unconscious, habitual behaviours (e.g., 32,33), and others on 
both, such as dual processing models (e.g.,24). The base assumptions of these models have been 
already thoroughly problematized, both from within (e.g., 34,35,36) and from outside social psychology 
(e.g.,19,37).  
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Critiques can be organized around two main dimensions. First, that these models construct 
individuals as mainly rational and/or as manipulated by an external context to which they respond 
through automatic cognitive processes. Such studies look for direct and causal relations between 
variables such as norms and attitudes towards the environment, which in turn will predict how 
individuals will behave regarding it. In other words, as Howarth34 has put it, “the individual is seen in 
isolation, outside of her or his environment and then responding to it. This environment, when it is 
considered, is taken as a given; there is no exploration of the fact that the individual may influence 
the nature of the environment and vice versa” (p.694). As Shove also highlights “there is no obvious 
limit to the number of possible determinants [of the ‘environmental’ attitude and/or behaviour] and 
no method of establishing their history, their dynamic qualities, their interdependence” (p.1275).  
At a deeper, more substantial level, the issue is that these models are still mainly anchored 
in a Cartesian and realist perspective (see38,39) on the relation between the individual and the social 
(see34 for a discussion) and therefore treat the context – both social and bio-physical38 - as an 
external variable, independent from the individual, and that will influence her behaviour, instead of 
conceiving the individual and the context as interdependent, mutually constitutive, and 
transformative. Associated with this first aspect then, and as a second main critique, is the fact that 
these frameworks fail to recognize how history, ideology and communication constitute (and are 
constituted by) people’s actions39, by developing a representation of the individual38 as responsible 
for her own choices and behaviours. This fails to acknowledge that such individualism is not only a 
theoretical position but a political one19, with specific social and ecological consequences17 and 
antecedents. This is associated with a dominant trend that runs throughout the 20th century: the 
individualisation of psychology, which has led to a somewhat decontextualized, asocial and apolitical 
understanding of the individual/social beings34, a position which is in itself shaped by a specific 
socio-economic context, as in the current neo-liberal capitalist one. There has been a growing 
acknowledgment of these limitations by Psychological research – at least by some authors (e.g.,41)  - 
and even at a more institutional level (e.g., British Psychology Society report on Behaviour Change: 
Energy Conservationc), but these limitations are often still found in some psychologists’ research and 
professional practices and therefore still often inform policies and measures on environmental 
behavior change. 
For the present paper two particular shortcomings of these perspectives will be explored, as 
they are particularly relevant for environmentally relevant actions and as because they have been 
somewhat neglected in critiques in this field to date (for important exceptions see17,41). These are 
a) The construction of the consumer-citizen in neo-liberal and capitalist systems 
b) The dominance of mainstream individualistic perspectives within social psychology 
 
 
 
 
a) The construction of the consumer-citizen in neo-liberal and capitalist systems  
The embeddedness of nature/human relations in specific socio-economic and political systems is 
rarely acknowledged (for exceptions see e.g.41) either within environmental psychology or, more 
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generally, by research on environmental-relevant actions (for some examples, see15,16,20,22,31). 
However, for a thorough understanding of ‘anti-environmental’ and (anti-)consumerist actions, it is 
crucial that we recognise that “Global warming and climate change are largely the result of 
globalised processes of capitalist production, while at the same time, it is not the human species as a 
whole who is to blame, but disproportionately the advanced capitalist nations of the world, and 
large corporate multinationals” as Barry14 proposes, (p.150; see also12).  
In turn, this implies that it is crucial to acknowledge that individualist, realist perspectives within 
psychology construct the individual through a neo-liberal lens42,43, and thus, as a discipline and as 
part of everyday discourse, are contributing to re-producing and maintaining that ideology34,42,43 (see 
also44,45). That individualism has influenced our psychology is however not usually considered by 
environmental psychologists (e.g.,15,22,31) – or (social) psychologists working on environmental issues. 
This overlooks the ways that the “research community is itself implicated in the reproduction and 
persistence of competing models of social change”19 (p.1274) and that psychology has “the power to 
create the very forms of thinking that it attempts to identify”34 (p.702), such as the self, autonomy, 
choice, identity41. For instance, Fresque-Baxter and Armitage46, distinguish between the different 
approaches that can be used to look into people-place relations in their role for climate change 
adaptation, namely, the cognitive-behavioural approach, the health and well-being approach, and 
the collective action approach. But the authors seem to fail to recognize that these different 
discourses are institutionalized in our societies and so shape and are shaped by psychology itself – 
particularly within health and well-being discourses, associated with the governing of the self and 
biopolitics - a very pervasive example today47. 
Within this perspective the very idea of individual responsibility for environmental actions is 
considered as both an outcome and a driver of that neoliberal, capitalist rationality42, where social 
beings are made to feel and think to be fully responsible for her own successes and failures in all 
domains of life, including the global environment. This is evident in how individualizing approaches 
tend to understand and transform non-environmental actions, namely habitual ones – these are 
thought to be only transformed through (neo-)behaviourist techniques (e.g.,15) as put forward by 
theories such as Nudge and currently integrated in policy initiatives in countries like the UK (e.g., UK 
Cabinet Offices of Behavioural Insights Team – see18; also19). This perspective aims to manipulate 
individuals’ behaviours so that they change in a desired direction and it has been widely criticised for 
such, on ethical grounds (see18).  Shove19,25, in particular, highlights how it is antithetical to a Social 
Practice perspective, as it ignores the ways in which attitudes and behaviours are grounded in 
specific contexts and have a certain history, embedded in particular structures and institutions. In 
other words, it ignores how individuals’ behaviours are embedded in particular practices.  
Individualizing approaches construct the individual as a citizen-consumer, which vividly inserts 
her in a specific socio-economic and political system. What social and ecological consequences does 
this have? As several authors have pointed out48,49,50, current neoliberal ‘citizen engagement’ 
societies are mainly post-politicald and undemocratic, as they tend to foster only consensual 
understandings of political action and to minimise antagonism and conflict, therefore just keeping 
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‘business as usual’ and not allowing real, structural, social change to happen (see also15,51). As 
Swyngedouw48 and Zizek49 highlight, climate change is often used by the dominant socio-economic 
and political systems in the global north to present environmental and social problems not as the 
result of inequalities and unevenly distributed resources and power, but as the result of a universal 
‘us’ – humans, as the sum of all individuals – and/or a non-controllable nature. This perspective 
obscures those very social inequalities and the capitalisation of nature by techno-managerial 
governments and corporations. In turn, this contributes to further de-politicizing our societies, to 
further accentuate social inequalities, and the human-nature divide (see also38).  
In sum, what we have tried to highlight is that it is crucial to, first, recognize that re-presenting 
the individual citizen-consumer as the source of environmental concerns is actually part and parcel 
of the very socio-cultural and political context in which these re-presentations are embedded and, 
second, that endorsing this re-presentation will impede the necessary social and political change 
towards more environmentally sustainable societies (see also41). Doing this, in turn, allows changing 
the foci of research in very specific ways. As Uzzell & Rathzel41 carefully argue, adopting a more 
individualising perspective often goes hand-in-hand with a focus on the analysis of actions in the 
private sphere to the detriment of actions in the public sphere - such as accepting a wind farm in the 
place where one lives or installing solar panels - and, more importantly, the fact that these actions 
are shaped by power relations between government, corporations and citizens10. As Uzzell & 
Rathzel41 (p.342) put it “attacking consumer behaviour simply addresses the ‘downstream’ 
symptoms rather than the ‘upstream’ causes of environmental problems”. In fact, this perspective 
tends to leave unacknowledged the fact that the production and supply side of energy systems is 
shaped by the political and socio-economic background in which it is embedded, as is clear in the UK 
where several environmental policies, such as those fostering the deployment of windfarms and 
solar panels or making new homes ‘zero carbon’, have been removed since the Conservative 
government went to power52.  
We suggest that in order to tackle this and examine people’s environmentally relevant actions 
more comprehensively, to include the socio-psychological processes impacting them, and their 
inscription in socio-political and economic systems, we need to look for other perspectives that do 
not individualise human action and social change. We turn next to this challenge.  
 
b) The dominance of mainstream individualistic perspectives within social psychology  
Associated with the criticisms outlined above, another important limitation of an 
individualizing perspective is that the researchers working with it tend to leave unacknowledged 
other epistemological perspectives and theoretical frameworks that exist within social psychology 
which are relevant to the field. Even when they are acknowledged, it is often without fully engaging 
with them, applying them and problematizing the very different assumptions and consequences that 
they bring forth (e.g.15; also16,31,53)e.  
Within social psychology, perspectives that focus on the social and political nature of 
knowledge have been somewhat marginalised, such as discursive psychology36, critical social 
psychology/discourse analysis55,56, and SRT57,58,59,60 f. In contrast to the mainstream ones within 
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psychology that are still mainly realist55, these approaches are arguably all socio-constructionist62, in 
this context meaning that they consider context and relations as constitutive dimensions of climate-
relevant actions, and not as external variables. Scholars working with more realist perspectives tend 
to conceptualise meaning-construction and negotiation as cognitive processes, or to re-cognitivise 
these processes even if they do not explicitly seem to adhere to cognitivist assumptions. For 
example, this is clear in the review developed by Fresque-Baxter & Armitage46, where they present 
the work of socio-constructionist scholars on place identity with a realist, cognitive perspective, with 
reference to the work of Dixon and Durrheim63 arguing “we experience the social meanings of places 
held by others, these function to shape reality” (p.255). However, within a socio-constructionist 
perspective these meanings are (one) reality (among others), and we do not directly experience the 
social meanings of places held by others as such, but we co-construct meanings with others in 
context64, even if it is in opposition to those others.  
Using a distinction put forward by Wagner58 between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ versions of the 
social, we can say then that different perspectives operate with different versions of the social. 
Individualist realist perspectives mainly endorse a weak version of the social, by which individuals 
are seen as cognizers of an external world which can influence their behavior through a cause-effect 
relationship and which can represent that world either in a true or in a false way; more social 
perspectives such as SRT can be said to endorse a strong version of the social, as it assumes that 
objects exist and social constructed re-presentations about them exist as much in the cognitions of 
individuals as in societal institutions and structuresg; similarly most discursive approaches can be 
considered as being closer to endorsing a super-strong version of the social, by considering that 
objects only exist insofar as they are socially and collaboratively enacted in discourseh 59.  
In sum, and despite the pervasiveness of more individualist and realist perspectives within 
social psychology, this field of research is quite diverse and some of the other approaches that have 
been developed within/in relation to it, namely SRTi, can be seen as quite close to more sociological 
approaches, such as theories of practice, to which we next turn.   
 
The sociological approaches to environmentally relevant actions and change 
“How do societies change? Why do they stay so much the same?” (p.1) are the questions 
that introduce SPT in the book by Shove, Pantzar and Watson25. Social practice theory “diverts 
attention away from moments of individual decision-making” focusing instead on “the ‘doing’ of 
various social practices”51 (p. 83), such as showering, travelling or playing football. A practice is then 
“a routinized type of behavior which consists of several elements, interconnected to one another: 
forms of bodily activities, forms of mental activities, ‘things’ and their use, a background knowledge 
in the form of understanding, know-how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge”72 (pp. 249-
250).  
To summarise, a practice is commonly considered to be composed of meanings, 
competences, materials and connections between these different elements25. Therefore, the 
individual is seen as a carrier of “conventionalized ‘mental’ activities of understanding, knowing how 
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and desiring [which] are necessary elements and qualities of a practice in which the single individual 
participates, not qualities of the individual” (p.250). Or as Spaargaren73 puts it (p.815), “practices, 
instead of individuals, become the units of analysis that matter most” and it is practices that are 
considered to co-constitute individuals and not individuals that are considered to be responsible for 
those.  
In this sense, within theories of practice it is the state and other institutions that are 
considered to “configure the fabric and the texture of daily life” and therefore social practices are 
considered to be “socially, institutionally and infrastructurally configured”19 (p.1281). If we think 
again about the more individualist and realist perspectives within psychology, this brief presentation 
of SPT clearly highlights how this latter perspective is incompatible with them, despite some claims 
to the contrary (e.g.,15,16), and how it does propose and entail a completely different view on what is 
social change.  
Furthermore, theories of practice are distinctive in other ways. The performance of social 
practices is generally seen as the routine accomplishment of what people take to be ‘normal’ ways 
of life51 and in this sense “theories of practice are commonly thought to deal better with routine 
reproduction than with innovation” 25 (p.122; see also74). Nonetheless, social practice theorists do try 
to distinguish SPT from other theories, such as the multi-level perspective on socio-technical 
transitions (e.g.,75), by pointing out in contrast that change not only occurs in a layered, ordered and 
diachronic way, but also in a synchronic one, with stability being conceptualized as the “emergent 
and always provisional outcome of successfully faithful reproductions of practice”25 (p.13).  
There are different theories of practice (e.g.,25,72,76,77), and whereas discourse is mainly seen 
within SPT as also a routinized way of understanding and it is deemed as important as any other 
non-discursive practices, the role of ‘things’ has only started to be acknowledged in more recent 
versions of the theory (see72,73), following connections to Action Network Theory, specifically, 
Latour’s work (see72). This is one of the main differences between SPT and SRT - the role of objects 
or things. As Reckwitz78 argues, SPT recognizes and conceptualizes the impact of things in the social 
order “not just in terms of representations, or as things that are assigned and attributed meaning by 
human agents. The impacts and effects of the objects themselves, the role of inter-objectivity next 
to inter-subjectivity, and the idea of objects being ‘constitutive’ for social practices all have to be 
considered” (p.212). In this sense, SPT can also be said to endorse a strong version of the social58 j, 
but explicitly conceptualizing and empirically examining inter-objectivity as a process, therefore 
trying to overcome the fact that “the concept of intersubjectivity falls short by neglecting the 
influence of artefacts and by failing to appreciate relative objectivities that permit inter-objective 
relations to take place”79. However, at the same time, and while doing so, one might say that SPT 
therefore aims to be, and generally is seen to be, more of a sociological or cultural theory, whereas 
SRT (see below) is intrinsically a socio-psychological theory.  
However, Spaargaren73 highlights how SPT can be said to have “left rather under-theorised the 
cultural dimension of green lifestyles and consumption routines”, and, in particular the 
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conceptualization and analysis of agency and the role of symbols, while paying more attention to the 
role of technologies or the material (p.818; see also17). Spaargaren73 (p.819) puts forward a proposal 
to try to overcome this limitation by suggesting that SPT has then to look into how “citizen-
consumers get excited or disappointed, enthusiastic or sad, energized or bored with the objects that 
co-constitute the practice of consumption”. However, this proposal lacks a more explicit and direct 
conceptualization of the role of the Other (and so of the social) in influencing the emotions and 
meanings that co-develop between agents and objects, which is (also) what gives practices their 
cultural dynamics. Moreover, this quotation also highlights one main critique that has been pointed 
out to SPT, which is the fact that it is too structural and therefore arguably reductionist, while  
“ignoring actors’ understandings altogether’, including the rejection of ‘any space for more 
conscious deliberation’ and an ability to actively re-evaluate, sometimes contest, and live with, 
contradictory [enthusiastic AND sad, to re-phrase Spaargaren’s quotation] social practices. It is 
remarkable that social practice approaches make little conceptual space for people’s own awareness 
of ecological degradation [as one, among others, interpretations of ‘reality’] and their possible 
contribution to it”17 (p. 54). 
 In this vein, SPT can also be considered to not fully problematize the ideological and political 
underpinnings of this approach, at least empirically (albeit it does so to a much greater extent than 
proponents of the individualist perspective– e.g.,15,16), while limiting the role for citizens’ agency. In 
fact, both the individualising psychology perspective and SPT in general seem to attribute the 
possibility for change as mainly coming from “above”, from researchers and policy-makers that can, 
be it through manipulating individuals’ behaviours (in the psychology mainstream perspective, 
through ‘nudging’ for example) or changing socio-technical systems (the government’s providing 
people with already environmentally friendly houses, in SPT), foster change. However, it often also 
happens that change starts being proposed at that level only after citizens and active lay minorities 
have pressured and fought for such changes to be incorporated into laws and policy-making, or 
institutionalized (as further discussed below; see also80). In other words, we cannot forget that 
innovation can also emerge bottom-up from public spheres, and these can push for legal and 
scientific spheres to transform their practices. In a related way, in SPT, action and meanings – or 
doings/behavior and sayings/thought – tend to be viewed at both conceptual and analytical levels as 
one and the same, even if this is an important distinction in everyday knowledge and which allows 
people to deal with and accommodate contradiction59. It therefore leaves little space precisely for 
the possibility and examination of (the role of) contradiction and polissemy within and between 
discourses and practices in knowledge production and transformationk l (see10,59,80).  
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SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS THEORY AS A SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE TO BETTER 
UNDERSTAND PEOPLE’S RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE  
In this section we will present SRT, arguing that it offers a strong account of social 
knowledge, a useful theorisation of social change, and an informative account of action. These three 
dimensions can contribute to a more complete understanding of climate-related actions, in 
particular if integrated and expanded with SPT. Starting with social knowledge, a central goal of SRT 
is to account for how “thinking is necessarily social”81. For this, it refuses the notion that meaning 
emerges from stable characteristics of subjects and direct subject-object relations, and centrally 
assumes that its genesis is relational, as the “relationship between Ego and Object is mediated 
through the intervention of another subject (Alter)” (pg. 52)m. By focusing on the dialogical nature of 
knowledge/practices production based in intersubjectivity, SRT is intrinsically a socio-psychological 
theory (see also63,79). It highlights how “all encounters with the world are mediated through 
relationships”59 (p.479) with other social beings, and therefore on how meanings are always 
relational and co-constructed – and contested, in a community of others (see60).  
In fact, two major consequences follow from assuming the Ego-Alter relation as the locus of 
meaning making82: (1) there can be no meaning making outside a given culture and its institutions 
(e.g. a nation, and its laws); (2) there can be no meaning making outside a given context – both 
social and bio-physical (e.g., a school). Furthermore, many, although not all, instances of meaning-
making, involve an interaction with a present Other in a given context (e.g. a conversation in the 
schoolyard)83. So a corollary of the triadic model is that for understanding meaning making we need 
to take into account the three dimensions of culture, context and interaction, and acknowledge that 
these are not external variables. 
The consequences of this model are then that “the central and exclusive object of social 
psychology should be the study of all that pertains to ideology and to communication”84. Looking at 
ideology – i.e. the systems of meaning and action of a culture – means taking culture into account. 
Looking at communication means taking context and interaction into account. However, the notion 
of ideology as used in this approach can be much better grasped if we extend the above definition 
by considering how the “systems of meaning and action of a culture” are not all equal and surely do 
not give voice equally well to all the groups of a society85,86. Some of these systems – or social re-
presentations - are institutionalized and rather stable and consensual - or hegemonic - thus very 
powerfully capable of defining ‘how the world is’ and what is ‘natural’ or considered common sense; 
while others are still mainly being contested - or polemic - pushing for change and more unstable, or 
are at least still under some negotiation - the emancipated ones85 (see also70, for an illustration). 
An important dimension of SRT’s theorizing of social change is thus the notion that because 
there is in every culture and every context a battle between re-presentations of different types, it is 
not change per se that needs to be understood, but instead the relations between change and 
stability59, therefore echoing Shove and colleagues’ uptake of SPT25. For instance, hegemonic 
representations’ power to define what is ‘natural’ allows them to set limits to what can be said and 
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done, and to thus exclude certain courses of action while keeping the door open for others87. 
Relatedly, when innovation enters a society or a context, they reveal the capacity to absorb 
innovation, making it more innocuous than it potentially could become59. In other words, 
representations exist before and after people, and produce certain effects that to some extent are 
independent of who voices them88. 
Finally, a further consequence follows from assuming the Ego-Alter relation as the locus of 
meaning making: that it is not behaviour per se, but action as meaningful behaviour that we need to 
understand to gain an understanding of social change. Behaviour can happen outside triadic 
relations, as a reflex, for instance, but action, as meanings, can only emerge from triadic relations. In 
other words, action is always social. It is this conceptualisation that supports defending that 
“representations exist in action as well as in belief and discourse”89.  
In turn, this implies that SRT’s uptake of meanings and actions acknowledges the fact that 
re-presentations can either be transcendent or immanent to practices/actions59,90 - see Box 1). This 
is the assertion that meaning, ideas, can exist in a society independently of the practice/action to 
which they are relevant, or be transcendent to it, as ideas proposed through laws and policies which 
usually take time to generalize to people’s practices/actions – as is often the case nowadays in the 
environmental domain (see also93, for another example regarding gender discrimination laws). In 
addition, they can just exist for/in the practices/actions to which they are relevant, or be immanent 
to them, being brought to life in actions and only then eventually transforming ideas and meanings 
about them (see75, for another example on personal hygiene). This insight from SRT makes it easier 
to understand that recurrent phenomena of our societies, discussed above: a generalized agreement 
with normative new ideas, accompanied by a much less generalized consensus at the level of 
practices/actions. The ‘gap’ between ideas and actions so often found – or presented as found – 
regarding the environment can be looked at precisely as an example of the fact that contradictory 
meanings might co-exist and be used in different contexts when social change is happening (see 
also10) and, namely, when it stems from normative pressures – or transcendent representations - 
that do not imply direct sanctions to individuals and groups (see59;  also80). In sum, SRT suggests that 
distinguishing talk and action at an analytical level might be useful to understand certain social 
phenomena, even because it is an important distinction in everyday knowledge. Nevertheless, we do 
consider conceptually that talk and action are interdependent and that talk is action.  SRT 
researchers have been analyzing this issue from this perspective and have developed specific 
analytical tools for understanding that (such as the concept of ‘polyphasia’), as will be further 
detailed in the next section. In sum, social re-presentations are knowledge-making practices, 
materialized in social and institutional encounters58,60,70,71.  
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SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS THEORY, SOCIAL PRACTICES THEORY AND THEIR USEFULNESS 
IN UNDERSTANDING DIFFERENT STAGES OF THE SOCIAL CHANGE PROCESS TOWARDS 
ENVIRONMENTALLY SUSTAINABLE SOCIETIES 
In this last section, we aim to highlight how SRT, as a distinctly socio-psychological approach, 
can be articulated with SPT, in two ways. At an epistemological level, and as just described before, 
SRT and SPT certainly share several assumptions and are therefore compatible – in a way that 
contrasts directly with more individualising  and realist perspectives in psychology. However, SRT 
and SPT are also different in several regards, in a way that might make their articulation productive. 
We will first look at these different aspects. 
 
Combining SRT and SPT in a synchronic way 
BOX 1 
TRANSCENDENT AND IMMANENT REPRESENTATIONS: EXAMPLES 
Denise Jodelet91 describes, based on an ethnographic study, a paradigmatic example of 
immanent representations. The context of the study was a French village with a 
psychiatric establishment, which would allow psychiatric patients to lodge with people 
living in the village. Dimensions of the villagers’ re-presentations of ‘madness’ were only 
observable through their non-verbal actions, such as the use of separate utensils and 
crockery for lodgers, revealing their fear of being ‘contaminated’ – and often these 
actions were contradictory with their verbal reports (e.g., There’s nothing to be 
frightened of in the illness, it’s not contagious. But, still, a lot of the lodgers would quite 
happily kiss a child and I don’t like to see that).  
An example of transcendent representations is public engagement in environmental 
decision-making (see59,86). Public engagement has been institutionalized as a 
transcendent representation through several treaties and policies (e.g.,92), namely in the 
global north, aiming that experts and decision-makers involve the public in decision-
making that affects them, in a participative, democratic way. However, as these treaties 
and policies do not affect actions directly – they do not sanction who does not comply 
with them -, they leave room for experts and decision-makers to agree with them – 
because they are normative – whilst at the same time not actually involving members of 
the public in environmental decision-making or just doing it in a tokenistic way.  
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How SPT can inform SRT 
One of the first aspects already clearly identified above in which SPT can add to SRT is the 
better conceptualization and examination of the role of the material in social re-presenting, not only 
in terms of technologies and infrastructures65,94,95, but also regarding ecological or bio-physical 
systems38,96. The role of objects in social re-presenting – through an explicit SRT perspective – is 
increasingly acknowledged, namely through proposals around inter-objectivity in inter-cultural 
encounters (see79) or calls for recognizing the role of the material in re-presentations97, particularly 
in relation to the environment10. Most concretely, a particular line of research has developed 
installation theory, which is closely connected to SRT97. This is particularly important if we consider 
that things and spaces are also performative of power relations and thus have very specific and 
powerful impacts on re-presentations98. Moreover, due to the original aims of SRT57, this theory has 
not paid as much attention to ordinary practices and the everyday interactions between people and 
Others (people and objects) as SPT has been doing, with researchers using theories of practice 
focusing mainly on everyday practices and therefore paying more attention to the contextual 
contingencies of everyday actions, including environmental ones (see73). There is still then much 
open space for SRT to develop the role of the material in re-presentation, and while endorsing a 
strong version of the theory.  
The same stands for the non-human generally which SRT has also often not taken into 
account. However, besides Actor Network Theory, other theories within sociology and human 
geography, such as cyborg/hybridity theories38,96,99 have highlighted the importance of an ontological 
relational politics which does not ‘kill off nature’ and recognizes that it is enacted and co-produced 
by human beings (see also17). As Whatmore96suggests, this politics seeks to abandon dualisms and 
reifications such as those of distance and proximity, inside and outside, then and now, often applied 
in environmental studies and when looking at nature and wilderness – the point of departure should 
be that animals, people, soils are already hybrid, there are no pre-existing essences, only relations 
between different entities. Following Shove and colleagues25, SPT, through taking these proposals 
more on board, can help to better understand aspects of human and non-human relations. In fact, 
while focusing on the examination of practices, SPT can help with understanding what those 
“cyborg/hybrid entities are actually doing” (p.9) – and in this way even go beyond Actor Network 
Theory (for more on this, see25). Nevertheless, both SPT and mainly SRT have been ‘accused’ of not 
sufficiently considering the bio-physical, ecological context in social practices and re-presentations’ 
research, namely, through considering the role of place100,101. In fact, SRT has been pinpointed as 
also being Cartesian to some extent, not in relation to the social context, but to the bio-physical, 
ecological one100,101. SPT, on the other hand, even if, as highlighted before, better recognizing and 
integrating the idea of the co-production of practices by ecological and social systems, empirically 
tends to neglect the role played by place and space in practices such as washing up, heating the 
household, among others. 
A second aspect that SPT can add to SRT then is precisely the focus on ‘doing’ or practices 
and the associated use of more ethnographic methodologies, such as in Jodelet’s study (see Box 1), 
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which have not often pervaded SRT’s research. Related with this, SRT has often been criticized for 
not taking sufficiently into account the history of meanings102 (but see103). SPT, on the contrary, 
performs genealogies of practices, analyzing how “practices are classified and how categories 
themselves evolve”27 (p.54). A good example of this is daily showering and how SPT traces its history 
- how in other historical periods, bathing would be a weekly activity (at most), and how 
infrastructures and associated meanings had to co-evolve for daily showering to happen more 
frequently and to be justified by the necessity to be clean (see more on27; also18,88).  
 
How SRT can inform SPT  
In turn, SRT can add to SPT in at least two ways. First, by conceptualizing people as agentic in 
bringing about social change, and second by offering an account of the role of Self-Other and power 
relations in allowing, constraining and/or enabling it. As pointed out above, SPT has been criticized 
(see17) for ignoring actors’ awareness of different practices, and their ability to negotiate them and 
to actually perform some instead of others. SRT’s uptake implies emphasizing that social beings can 
be aware of the “co-existence of a social representation and its alternative “105 (p.83).  This 
awareness of alterityn and the capability of perspective-taking allows change to happen, at 
individual, contextual-relational and societal levels (see also83, 86) – even if it is also what allows 
resistance to endure. The analytical tools that SRT has developed in this regard, such as that of 
polyphasia88,108, the notion of themata105,109,110, the distinction between the normative and 
functional dimensions of representations59,110, or the distinction between reification and 
consensualisation as communicative formats88 (64,79,112), have been very helpful precisely in enabling 
the analysis of how both change and resistance to change happens. For instance, polyphasia refers 
to the coexistence of competing and even contradictory meanings, not only within the same culture 
and groups, but also within the same individual64. This notion is therefore very useful as an analytical 
tool in contexts of change as it calls our attention to the importance of analyzing if and how different 
meanings are used and in which contexts, therefore providing us with important insights about the 
social and psychological processes behind promotion or resistance to change (see also88,108,110). Also 
useful might be the distinction between reification and consensualisation as communicative formats 
used between different groups to negotiate change86. Batel and Castro86 systematized a way of 
identifying when these two communicative formats are being used and what their consequences 
might be for knowledge construction or change and resistance to change. Reification is used for 
displacing the knowledge of others and has monological consequences therefore usual implying 
some type of power resources; consensualisation involves perspective-taking and has more 
democratic outcomes. 
Conceiving the possibility of reflexitivity then, does not necessarily equate with believing in 
individual agency and choice as in Shove’s portrayal of the psychology ABC model or in Kurz and 
colleagues’15 account of the dominant psychology perspective on habit (see88, 105). It just means that 
thinking is arguing109,113, that is, it happens based on antinomies – or, as Batel88 puts it: 
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“it allows us to, on one hand, uncover how agency and subversion, or the capability 
to use different rationalities or representations, can be limited or enhanced by 
specific power relations, institutional arrangements or other normative practices and 
discourses and, through that, contribute to slow down or accelerate change. And, on 
the other hand, to also consider that, nevertheless, unequal social relations and 
dominant representations can be challenged and contested by social agents, 
collectively” (p. 10.10).  
As Shove and colleagues25 themselves highlight “we have not explicitly engaged with big 
debates about the rise of capitalist society or with questions of social and economic power, but that 
does not mean that these are in any sense absent from our analysis of the dynamics of social 
practice” (p.137). In fact, specific conceptualizations and empirical examinations of how particular 
intergroup relations and the differential power of different re-presentations affect environmental 
relevant (social) practices are often absent or non-explicit in research using SPT. In other words, SPT 
should pay more attention to the political dimension of environmentally relevant actions not only at 
a structural level, but also at more contextual and individual ones – or to borrow Howarth, Andreouli 
& Kessi’s114 formulation, the analysis of re-presentations/social practices has to be ”sensitive to the 
contexts, dynamics and specifics of intergroup relations as these are reflected in the processes of re-
presentation” (p.23-24).  The importance of taking this political dimension into account becomes 
quite clear if we think about how expert-lay relations – or re-presentations about these relations – 
strongly shape people’s environmental practices, with the NIMBY (Not in my Backyard) re-
presentation being a paradigmatic example of that (see10,70).   
In fact, and as a second input from SRT to SPT, at its incept57 SRT aimed to understand 
specifically how new scientific knowledge was appropriated and used as common sense in everyday 
lives. Therefore we can consider that SRT has more experience in examining cultural and techno-
scientific change (e.g.,10,108,111,114,115,116) and how it is appropriated in contemporary heterogeneous 
public spheres64. For instance, SRT has identified anchoring and objectification (see Box 2) as the 
socio-psychological processes through which people make the unfamiliar, familiar10.  
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In a related way, SRT has a long expertise in examining how Others shape people’s re-
presenting, and specifically the role of the media in doing this in contemporary public spheres, as 
the media is one of the main actors (re)creating the socio-cultural environments where we live. SRT 
has arguably done so more than SPT, therefore also usefully adding this expertise to research based 
on theories of practice. Research using SRT has illustrated, for instance, how the media can use 
different communicative modalities117 to present new ideas – such as regarding GMOs, geo-
engineering or climate change - which can in turn have very different consequences for how these 
and associated re-presentations are taken up and negotiated by publics (see57,117,; also5,115,118).  
We can perhaps say then that SRT is better equipped to look at the extraordinary – or at 
when social change is just introduced in a society or in a community, such as when a new low-carbon 
energy technology is constructed in a specific place10 - whereas SPT, due to the way it has been more 
frequently empirically used, can be considered as more conceptually suited to better understand 
climate relevant ordinary actions at the ‘consumption’ level, this is, when change has already started 
to be incorporated into people’s everyday practices. To give some concrete examples in what 
regards climate relevant actions, whereas SRT has been more concerned with understanding and 
examining people’s ideas and communicative practices regarding climate change in general 
(e.g.,115,118), public participation in environmental decision-making (e.g.,70,86), energy systems119, 
renewable energy and associated technologies (e.g.,10,116), and biodiversity conservation110; SPT has 
been more focused on examining energy demand104, travel/mobility practices18, smart energy 
BOX 2 
ANCHORING AND OBJECTIFICATION: A DEFINITION 
Anchoring allows the classification of new social objects or the unfamiliar into previous and 
familiar knowledge that makes up our cultures and traditions. An example, given by 
Howarth34, is the “social representations of Brixton (a culturally diverse area in South 
London) which are anchored in racist representations of blackness that thereby construct 
Brixton as black, dangerous and ‘other’ ” (p.696). 
Objectification is the process through which abstract ideas are made concrete, namely 
through making an image or a metaphor correspond to the object. Devine-Wright & Devine-
Wright116 illustrate how members of different local communities objectified A-frame high 
voltage electricity pylons, about to be constructed near to their communities, differently, 
depending on how those communities re-presented the place where they lived and the 
electricity pylons. Namely, while one community tended to present them as monstrous and 
eyesores, the other mainly presented them as “girls with whips striding across the 
countryside” (p.368). 
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domestic consumption120, air conditioning practices25, saving energy and reducing waste in the 
workplace51. Nevertheless, this suggests again that SRT and SPT can be articulated in a fruitful way 
for better understanding not only the same but also different facets of environmentally relevant 
actions.  
 
Combining SRT and SPT in a diachronic way 
SPT and SRT have common presuppositions that can allow their articulation, contrary to the 
more realist and individualist psychology perspective. Considering the ‘strengths and weaknesses’ of 
these two epistemological/theoretical approaches, we can consider that they might actually 
complement each other while contributing to understand different stages of the social change 
process towards environmental sustainability121, and relatedly the change and stability of 
(non)environmentally relevant actions. Departing from a SRT perspective, Castro and colleagues121,59 
have proposed that environmentalism, as a process of social change, is currently at its 
‘Generalisation’ stage (see also10): after its emergence as a social concern mainly through the 
influence of active minorities, namely grassroot movements103,122, several treaties and laws at 
supranational levels have institutionalised it while setting specific targets for and constraints on the 
practices of people towards environmental sustainability. Now, mediating systems between the 
legal sphere and the public one, such as the mass media and community practitioners, are 
circulating the content of those laws – and specific interpretations of them59 – which are expected to 
be appropriated by people, so that environmental sustainability can be attained. The proposal put 
forward by Castro and colleagues121 (see also80) does not critically discuss the models of social 
change that are being pursued with such legislations and treaties and, namely, to what extent they 
are targeting individuals’ behaviour change or more structural, social practices, change. In other 
words it conceptualizes how social change happens in current neo-liberal and capitalist systems, 
with a focus on mainly deeming individuals responsible for making that happen. Nevertheless, this 
model/proposal can also be seen as an in-between ‘solution’, which tries to conceptualize how social 
change happens in these socio-economic and political systems while, at the same time, showing how 
it can undermine them. In fact, it calls our attention to the importance of the legal system in 
contemporary societies, mainly Western, in fostering social change and, with that, to the fact, that 
contrarily to what both SPT and the individualist psychology perspectives seem to presuppose, 
individuals and groups can actually be aware of environmentalism and of alternative (and 
normative) representations to consumerism and anti-environmental action. To put it differently, it 
calls our attention to the important distinction, already highlighted above, between transcendent 
and immanent representations59,90 (see Figure 1).  
In this sense, we propose that while SRT might be more useful to understand how new meanings 
emerge, how they are disseminated throughout the public sphere and the socio-psychological 
processes associated with support, acceptance and/or resistance to change during that 
generalisation phase; SPT might be more useful to understand how those meanings then get 
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combined with technological innovation, material practices and the development of associated 
competences and how their connections are stabilized, become habits, and how these might act as 
barriers to new practices being adopted (see Figure 2). This framework can then be the basis for a 
research agenda regarding environmentally relevant actions which, by simultaneously highlighting 
the demand and supply side of those actions and how they are co-produced by individuals, 
institutions (both material and symbolic) and bio-physical contexts, can better uncover the socio-
economic, political, psychological, institutional, cultural and historical processes behind the stability 
and change of those actions, and arguably work to change those. These ideas and framework should 
then be made explicit and clearly inform related interventions for social change in the context of the 
ecological crisis, namely while both informing policies on environmentally relevant actions and while 
engaging with individuals and communities about those – during research and through designing 
specific community interventions. 
 
Sidebar title:  
Sidebar 1 - TRANSCENDENT AND IMMANENT REPRESENTATIONS: EXAMPLES 
Sidebar 2 – ANCHORING AND OBJECTIFICATION: A DEFINITION 
 
Conclusion 
  The current capitalist and neo-liberal socio-economic and political system has devastating 
consequences for ecological systems, creates and perpetuates social inequalities and exclusion and 
has consistently driven us further away from forming participative democratic institutions11,48. This 
critical review of the main (socio) psychological and sociological approaches used so far to 
understand and change climate relevant actions (e.g.,15,25), has clearly illustrated two aspects of the 
relation between the current socio-economic and political system and these approaches. First, that 
despite the fact that authors developing and implementing (socio) psychology’s mainstream 
approaches arguing for the neutrality, impartiality and scientific evidence-only based qualities of this 
research, it is unquestionable that similar to any other form of co-production of knowledge, this 
research is political – as in “the ontological dimension of antagonism”11 (p.XII). In other words, it 
does assume, defends and develops a specific perspective, with particular social and political 
antecedents and consequences. Specifically, and second, as shown throughout this review, that 
individualizing perspectives prevalent within social psychology look into people’s environmental-
relevant actions in an age of climate change, by simulating that scientific positivist neutrality, is 
actually endorsing and reproducing the neo-liberal and capitalist context where it developed and 
that it helped creating, despite not acknowledging and critically discussing this. Not all research 
within social psychology, and the social sciences generally, adopts such an approach, and obviously it 
is important to acknowledge that there exists a spectrum regarding the role attributed to the 
individual and that therefore some approaches are further away from the extreme of considering 
the individual as the locus of everything. However, that this is still the mainstream approach being 
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adopted within social psychology, related with the problems that we have just mentioned, highlights 
the urgent need to adopt other epistemological, ontological and, therefore, political, perspectives 
within the social sciences to examine and better understand peoples’ (non-)environmentally 
relevant actions. We suggested specifically that sociological theories of practice (e.g,25) and SRT, as 
an intrinsically socio-psychological theory, can, in articulation with one another, be those 
perspectives, given how they conceptualize processes and drivers of change, basis of action, and the 
relation between practices/actions and meanings, how they position policy and how much lessons 
are transferrable across time and space (see Table 1). These theories not only contribute to a better 
understanding of (non-)environmentally relevant actions, but also better enable a process of change 
to the current socio-economic system that we live in towards another world, in which the individual, 
consumption and corporations are not the measure of everything and, thus, that can arguably 
contribute to establishing another form of hegemony11,49 which aims at dissolving social inequalities 
and creating global environmental justice in social and ecological ways. This implies targeting not 
individuals but social practices25 or/and representations, as in people’s beliefs and actions. This, in 
turn, involves, generally, challenging the neo-liberal and capitalist system and, more specifically, 
might involve following three main courses of action. First, developing regulations and policy-
making, which target the materiality of people’s practices at production and consumption levels, 
instead of individuals’ consumption itself. In other words, what should be focused on is “the political 
relations that produce environmentally damaging ways of producing and consuming”41 (p.348) – or 
as also illustrated in the British Psychology Society’s report on behavior change regarding energy 
consumptionc, if leaving TVs and computers on stand-by is so damaging, then it has to be questioned 
why we have a stand-by facility on electrical goods? Second, and in an associated way, critically 
engaging with relevant knowledge producers – policy-makers, academic researchers, NGOs, and so 
forth - to transform re-presentations of individuals as either passive dupes and/or totally rational 
beings, into re-presentations of individuals as, in their continuous relation with the Other, both 
influenced and constrained by the contexts in which they live, and as aware, conscious, and active 
political actors, much in line with SRT’s representation of people88. In turn, this will contribute to the 
creation of more active forms of citizenship that can demand better regulations and policy-making. 
Finally, all of the above implies that the social sciences have an important role to perform and that it 
is therefore crucial that certain disciplines and research areas – such as Psychology – start to more 
fully acknowledge their impact on (re-)producing climate change and related issues.  
 
Notes 
a Throughout the manuscript we use the concepts of environmental and climate relevant actions as defined 
within the social sciences generally to refer to “human behaviours that contribute to environmental problems” 
(30, p.407). The use of this concept aims then to direct our discussion in a more specific way to a particular area 
of research and of public life which is that of the promotion of proenvironmental behaviors. However, and 
even following the discussion developed throughout this paper, it should be considered that all actions impact 
on, are affected by and co-evolve with the climate and the environment. 
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b Adapted from Jensen, D. (2015) Forget shorter showers: Why personal change doesn’t equate political 
change. Retrieved the 15th February 2015 from http://www.filmsforaction.org/articles/forget-shorter-
showers-why-personal-change-does-not-equal-political-change/  
c British Psychology Society report on Behaviour Change: Energy Conservation retrieved the 25th January from 
http://www.bps.org.uk/system/files/Public%20files/energy.pdf 
d As in fostering the consensualisation of a capitalist and neo-liberal ideology and not legitimising diverse and 
conflictive perspectives over socio-political and economic systems11.  
e Critics of social psychology, including those developing theories of practice, also tend then to only recognise 
as social psychology perspectives the mainstream individualist and realist ones and not to be aware of the 
epistemological and conceptual diversity of this field of research (e.g.,19). 
f Which together with behaviourism were the main perspectives making the history and present of social 
psychology at least until the turn of the XXth to the XIst century61, even if in the meantime other perspectives 
have grown like neuropsychology, evolutionary psychology and embodied cognition. 
g Even if there are authors that use more individualist and cognitive versions of the theory (see again58), 
endorsing a weak version of the social and thus rejecting social constructivist assumptions (e.g.22,65). 
h For some time SRT and discursive psychology were seen as irreconcilably different, with SRT being criticized 
by discursive psychologists (but see61,66) for still being ‘too’ cognitive (taking into account its focus on 
representation) and thus too close to mainstream (socio-)cognitive and individualistic approaches (e.g.,67; 
also68). However, SRT as adopted in this paper, incorporates some proposals of discourse analysis (both 
theoretically and methodologically, see69,70) and looks at re-presentation (instead of representation), as a 
process ‘in the making’ involving the dynamic construction and re-construction of meanings (see also71). 
i This is not to say that there are not other critical alternatives and conceptual imports, besides the ones 
discussed in this paper, that can be very relevant in allowing us to better understand environmental relevant 
practices, such as those coming from psychosocial studies, narrative analysis and psychoanalysis (for a 
discussion see14). 
j SPT can be said to incorporate more in its analyses the materiality of reality, contrarily to SRT – as will be 
further discussed in the paper. Nevertheless, and whereas SPT gives more importance to interobjectivity than 
SRT, it also equally recognizes the importance of intersubjectivity for the stability and transformation of social 
practices (see78), this being the reason why we consider that SPT can also be seen as endorsing a strong 
version of the social. 
k With this we are not assuming a dualistic Cartesian perspective that separates the mind from the body, but 
instead suggesting that analytically considering that doings and sayings might not be totally articulated is 
useful to understand the polissemy of symbols and meanings and how sometimes those can be strategically 
used by social agents to deal with change. In other words, we concur with Hinchliffe38 (p.62), borrowing from 
Deleuze, in suggesting that any differentiation of doings and sayings “can only be differences of degree and 
not of kind”. 
l Some versions of SPT do recognise or started to the importance of the Other through the focus on social 
networks; the existence of contradiction between the elements of practices25; and the fact that structures do 
also exist in individuals, not only in practices and thus that practices are structured in between the individual 
and societal structures78. Nevertheless, generally one can say that whereas authors like Spaargaren and Shove 
do suggest to take them into account, there does not seems to exist yet a rigorous approach that specifically 
accounts for these issues. 
m The Ego-Alter-Object triadic relation proposed by Serge Moscovici57 as the main basis of SRT, intends to 
signal the importance of the Other, that is, of relationships and intersubjectivity for knowledge construction of 
the Self about an object (and how the object impacts on the self). Introducing the Other in conceptualizing 
knowledge production instead of considering simply subject-object relations following the Cartesian, positivist 
tradition, implies then recognizing the importance of the spaces of mediation “that lie on the in between of 
intersubjective and interobjective relations”63 (p.15). 
n What we are proposing here is that individuals can be aware of different meanings insofar as they are part of 
communities/groups where different representations are available – we are not proposing it as an individual 
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process. In this vein, we are talking about reflexitivity – not rationality - as used by Kessi and Howarth28, which 
is the ability to be aware of different knowledges, which are constructed collaboratively, and can be used 
contextually to fulfill different functions and interests.   
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Figure captions 
Figure 1 – Relation between different forms of change/re-presentations and practices (meanings and 
actions) 
Figure 2 – The different stages of social change 
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Tables 
Table 1 – Behavior, Practice and Re-presentation 
 Theories of behavior Theories of practice Theory of social 
representations 
Basis of Action Individual choice Shared, social 
convention 
Social and individual as 
interdependent; 
individuals constrained 
by and creating the 
contexts where they 
live; political 
Processes of change Causal Emergent Emergent 
Positioning of policy External influence on the 
factors and drivers of 
behavior 
Embedded in the 
practices it seeks to 
influence 
Embedded in the 
practices it seeks to 
influence 
Transferrable 
lessons 
Clear: based on universal 
laws 
Limited by historical 
and cultural specificity 
Limited by historical 
and cultural specificity 
  Limited by bio-physical/ecological specificity 
Drivers of change Top-down, focused on 
individuals 
Bottom-up, individually 
driven 
Top-down, 
institutionally and 
infrastructurally 
driven; focused on 
practices 
Top-down, 
institutionally driven; 
focused on meanings 
and actions 
Bottom-up, 
communities-driven 
Units of Analysis Individuals’s attitudes 
and behaviors 
Social Practices Social Re-
presentations 
(meanings and actions) 
Relation between 
meanings and 
actions 
Attitudes/Meanings  
Behaviors/Actions 
Meanings = Actions Meanings  Actions 
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